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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since being introduced in 1955 (Müller, 1983), 
Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) are being in-
creasingly used today for intelligent transportation 
and distribution of materials in warehouses and/or 
manufacturing facilities. Such vehicles travel along 
predefined routes to deliver various tasks without the 
supervision of an on-board operator. Their reliability 
is crucial for ensuring normal industry production. 
However, the investigation and research about the 
reliability of AGVs are very few.  
From the openly published literature, it is known 
that Fazlollahtabar (2013) created a model in order 
to maximize the reliability of AGVs and minimize 
their repair cost. However, there are some funda-
mental questions, such as ‘How could AGVs fail?’ 
and ‘What are the possibilities of their failure?’, 
which were not yet answered in their work. To an-
swer these questions, Duran et al. (2013) has tried to 
identify the basic failure modes of the light detection 
and ranging (LIDAR) system and the camera-based 
computer vision system (CV) on AGVs by using a 
combined approach of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and Bayesian Belief Networks (BN). In the work, 
human injury, property damage and vehicle damage 
were defined as the top events in the fault tree. How-
ever, the research did not cover all components and 
subassemblies included in AGVs. Considering a 
complete investigation of the reliability issues of all 
AGV components and subassemblies is fairly impor-
tant not only to ensure the high reliability and avail-
ability of AGVs and their success of delivering pre-
scribed tasks but also to optimize their maintenance 
strategies.  The reliability issues of the whole AGV 
systems are investigated through assessing the reli-
ability of a typical AGV transport system in this pa-
per.  
In order to identify the crucial mission phases in 
AGV operations and predict the reliability of the 
whole AGV system, Petri net (PN) simulation is ap-
plied to the reliability assessment of the AGV. To 
ensure the correctness of the PN method, fault tree 
analysis (FTA) is also performed for the purpose of 
validation.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, a typical AGV system and 
their subassemblies are briefly introduced; in Section 
3, the basic principles of the PN modelling method 
are explained; in Section 4, reliability analysis of a 
typical AGV transport system is performed by using 
the PN method. Where, the fault trees for all phases, 
particularly phases 1 and 2, are given in order to es-
tablish the logic that is essential for PN simulation; 
in Section 5, the mission reliability at the end of each 
phase and the unreliability of each phase of a typical 
AGV transport system are calculated by using the 
PN method. Moreover, the PN method is verified 
through comparing its calculation results with those 
obtained from FTA; the paper is finally concluded in 
Section 6. 
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ABSTRACT: Automated guided vehicles (AGVs) are being extensively used due to their attributions of high 
efficiency and low costs. To assure their added value, taking a typical AGV transport system as an example, 
the reliability issues in AGVs are investigated in this paper. First of all, the AGV transport system was mod-
elled as a phased mission that comprises a few key phases. Then, the Petri net (PN) method is applied to de-
scribe the logic of the whole phase mission and based on this, the reliability of the mission is assessed via 
Monte-Carlo simulation. In order to validate the reliability assessment result by the PN method, the theoretical 
reliability of the AGV system is also assessed through performing fault tree analysis (FTA). The comparison 
indicates that both methods give very similar results. Thus, it can be concluded that apart from FTA, the PNs 
method is also a reliable tool for AGV system reliability assessment. 
2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A TYPICAL AGV 
SYSTEM 
In this paper, to facilitate the research a typical AGV 
transport system used in a warehouse for material 
distribution is chosen for analysis. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the AGV system consists of the following 
components: 
(1) drive unit –  a brushless DC electric motor 
which is responsible to provide power for the 
motion and operation of the AGV; 
(2) software control system – is responsible to proc-
ess and interpret the information received from 
both the laser navigation system and safety sys-
tem, and send either motion or operation orders; 
(3) laser navigation system – was developed by 
MacLeod et al. (1993). In the AGV, it is in es-
sence a position measurement system that is re-
sponsible to locate the AGV. It comprises a ro-
tating laser installed on the board of the AGV 
and three beacons mounted along the border of 
the area covered in a warehouse; 
(4) safety system – is designed to avoid obstacles 
that could appear on the pathway with the aid of 
a laser detection system installed on the AGV; 
(5) attachments – refers to those additional compo-
nents that are used to assist moving and carrying 
of items; 
(6) batteries – are usually the common lead–acid 
batteries. They are responsible to supply power 
to the whole AGV system; 
(7) brake system – is responsible to slow down or 
stop the AGV in the case of necessities. It is al-
ways applied when the AGV stands still in park-
ing space;  
(8) steering system – is responsible to dominate the 
manoeuvre of the AGV; 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A typical AGV system schematic. 
 
If all these aforementioned components are nor-
mal in health, then their synchronous operation will 
enable the AGV to successfully distribute materials 
to multiple places in a warehouse according to dif-
ferent requirements. But when receiving a task order, 
the AGV will, first of all, optimize the routes for 
completing the whole mission. The routes that will 
be optimized include:  
(1) the route from its parking position to material 
collection port; 
(2) the route from material collection port to target 
position; and 
(3) the route from target position back to its original 
parking position.  
Initially, the AGV will travel to the material collec-
tion port along the optimized route to pick up the 
materials. After the AGV is loaded with the materi-
als, it will travel to the destination and unload the 
materials. After successfully distributing the materi-
als, the AGV will travel back to its original parking 
position. Therefore, the whole mission can be di-
vided into 6 phases in total, namely mission alloca-
tion and route optimization, dispatch to station, load-
ing of item, travelling to storage, unloading and 
finally travelling back to base. The mission can be 
regarded as successful only when the AGV is able to 
operate successfully throughout all these 6 phases 
without any break due to component and/or system 
failures and maintenance. Such a period is named as 
a maintenance-free operational period (MFOP) (Di-
vision, 1998).  
3 RELIABILITY MODELLING METHODS 
In the past decades, FTA has been widely adopted 
for modelling the reliability issues met in industrial 
practice. Through inspecting the logic between the 
undesired events that could happen in a system or a 
mission, FTA allows us to trace back the root cause 
of a system or mission failure by using a systematic 
top-down approach. Moreover, with the aid of FTA 
the probability of system or mission failure can be 
computed via Boolean logic calculations. Attributed 
to that FTA provides a straightforward and clear 
presentation to the logic between various undesired 
events and moreover it supports both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. FTA has been regarded as an 
effective, systematic, accurate and predictive method 
to deal with the safety and reliability problems in 
complex systems, such as the safety issues in a nu-
clear power plant (NUREG/1150, 1990). However, it 
is difficult to construct a fault tree when the system 
of interest is large and complex. For this reason, an 
alternative reliability modelling method, namely 
PNs, was developed by Petri in 1962 (Petri, 1962).    
Similar to FTA, PN provides an intuitive graphi-
cal representation of the reliability problem being 
investigated. But by contrast, the PN method is more 
suited to dealing with the reliability issues in com-
plex systems attributed to their efficient computing 
algorithm.  
The PNs method is, in essence, a direct bipartite 
graph. As shown in Figure 2, it basically consists of 
the following four types of symbols:  
 Circles – represent the places, which are condi-
tions or states such as mission failure, phase fail-
ure, or component failure depending on the issue 
being considered; 
 Rectangles – represent the transitions, more ab-
stractly actions or events. It should be mentioned 
that if time for completing the transition is zero, a 
solid rectangular bar can be used, otherwise it is 
hollow; 
 Arrows – represent connections between places 
and transitions. It should be noticed that arcs with 
one slash on it and a number next to it represent a 
combination of several single arcs with a weight 
to/from the same transition. No slash always 
means that the weight is one; 
 Small marks – represent tokens which carry the 
information in PNs. They move via transitions as 
long as the enabling condition is satisfied, which 
gives dynamic properties of the PN. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Enabling and switching of transition, (a) before ena-
bling transition, (b) after enabling transition. 
 
Figure 2 shows an example of the movement of 
tokens through a net. From Figure 2a, it is seen that 
there are two inputs and one output place connected 
to a timed transition with a time delay t. The input 
places have arcs with weights 2 and 3, respectively. 
The transition is enabled when the number of tokens 
contained in every input place is not less than the 
corresponding arc weights. Once the transition is en-
abled, the arc weight number of tokens will be taken 
out from the corresponding input place to fulfil the 
transition after the time delay t associated with the 
transition. For the example shown in figure 2 one 
more token will appear in the output place. But it is 
necessary to note that after completing the transition, 
the number of tokens that are increased in the output 
place is dependent on the corresponding arc weight 
as well. For example, if the arc weight connected to 
the output place is ‘n’, then n more tokens will ap-
pear in the output place after enabling the transition.  
In the aspect of phase mission simulation, Mura 
& Bondavalli (2001) proposed to use two distinct 
PNs, namely a system net and a phase net, to model 
phased missions; Such an idea was later further ex-
tended by Chew et al. (2008) to simulate more com-
plex systems by using three distinct PNs, i.e. phase 
PN (PPN), component PN (CPN) and master PN 
(MPN). These three kinds of PNs are linked together 
and interact with each other. Such an extended ap-
proach is adopted in this paper to assess the reliabil-
ity of AGV systems.  
4 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF AN AGV 
TRANSPORT SYSTEM USING THE PN 
METHOD 
In this section, the reliability problem of a typical 
AGV transport system will be investigated by using 
the extended PN-based method mentioned in section 
3. The details are depicted as follows. 
4.1 Phase Petri net 
The PPN presents the system failure at each phase 
due to component failures. The logic used for im-
plementing FTA can be directly applied for con-
structing PPN. For this reason, the fault trees con-
structed for phases 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 3 to 
ease understanding. 
From Figure 3, it is seen that in each phase level 
fault tree, the failure of phase mission is used as the 
top event, the failures of those AGV components 
that are involved in the phase are basic events. The 
failures of mechanical parts, the failures of system 
parts for navigation, control and safety, and the fail-
ures of power supply are the intermediate events. 
From these fault trees, how the identified AGV 
components affect the success of each phase has 
been clearly presented. For example, in the first 
phase ‘mission allocation and route optimisation’, 
first of all the laser navigation system (LNS) needs 
to correctly locate the AGV’s position. Then, all 
routes for completing the phase mission should be 
properly optimised via the AGV software control 
system (ASCS). Once either one of LNS or ASCS 
fails to work properly, the phase 1 mission cannot be 
accomplished. Moreover, the successful completion 
of phase 1 mission also relies on safe power supply, 
the failure of which can lead to unsuccessful phase 1 
as well. In Phase 2, the AGV will travel from its 
parking position to the material collection port. Dur-
ing the period, the ASCS will control the AGV to 
travel along the optimised route; the LNS works 
over the whole course of the phase to locate the 
AGV as it moves; the motor is required to drive the 
vehicle; the steering system enables vehicle turning; 
the safety system performs obstacle scan; and the 
brake system is responsible to slow down the vehicle 
when turning and stop the vehicle to avoid colli-
sions. Obviously, the success of phase 2 mission re-
lies on the synchronously cooperation of all these 
subassemblies. The fault of either one of them can 
lead to the failure of phase 2. In addition, it is worthy 
to note that phase 2 can be started only after phase 1 
has been completed successfully. In other words, the 
mission failure in phase j+1 is the combined result of 
successful phases 1 to j and the system failure occur-
ring in phase j+1 via an ‘AND’ gate. In addition, in 
Figure 3 the ‘NOT’ gate is used to represent system 
success during a phase. Following this logic, the 
AGV operation is analysed at each phase.  
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Figure 3. Fault trees for Phases 1 and 2, (a) Phase 1, (b) Phase 
2. 
 
Likewise, the logic existing in phases 3-6 can be 
readily identified as well. Herein, they will not be 
described to keep a concise context. But to facilitate 
analysis, the component failures that lead to the sys-
tem failure at different phases are listed in Table 1, 
from which the logic in each phase can be inferred. 
Table 1: Component failures that cause the system failure 
at each phase. 
Phase Component failures causing system failure at 
each phase 
1 ASCS; LNS; Batteries 
2 Drive unit (DC); Brake system; Steering system; 
ASCS; LNS; Safety system (SS); Batteries 
3 Attachments; Brake system; ASCS; 
Safety system; Batteries; 
4 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; Safety system (SS);  
Attachments; Batteries; Brake system;  
Steering system 
5 Attachments; Brake system; ASCS; 
Safety system (SS); Batteries; 
6 Drive unit; ASCS; LNS; Safety system(SS);  
Batteries; Brake system; Steering system 
 
Once the logic existing at all phases are identi-
fied, the PPN at each phase can be constructed. The 
PPN corresponding to the fault trees depicted in Fig-
ure 3 are shown in Figure 4. Where ‘P’, ‘IC’ and 
‘MP’ stand for phase, input and control in the phase, 
and mechanical part in the phase, respectively. In 
addition, ‘tokens’ are absent from all places in Fig-
ure 4. That means the whole AGV system and its 
components are in the good health condition. In 
other words, the presence of a token in a place will 
mean the failure of either a component or a phase. 
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Figure 4. Phase Petri net, (a) for phase 1, (b) for phase 2. 
 
P1 Failure 
IC1 Failure 
Batteries Down 
LNS Down 
ASCS Down 
P2 Failure 
ASCS Down IC2 Failure 
LNS Down 
SS Down 
Brake Down MP2 Failure 
Steering down 
DC Down 
Batteries Down 
From Figure 4, it is noticed that the transition is 
symbolized by solid rectangular bars. That implies a 
component failure will result in a system failure in-
stantly without any time delay.  
4.2 Component Petri Net 
As shown in Figure 5, the CPN is used to model the 
health states of AGV components. As the mission 
has been modelled as a MFOP, the repair of compo-
nents will not be considered in this study. Therefore, 
the components in the CPN will show only two 
kinds of health states, i.e. ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. 
Once a component fails after working for a certain 
period of time, the token in the ‘component up’ 
places will be transferred to the ‘component down’ 
places. The time for this failure transition can be 
computed by using the random sampling and expo-
nential distribution method, which is supported by 
the component failure rate data (Andrews & Moss, 
2002). For simplicity, in this paper all of the AGV 
components are assumed to be independent of each 
other, which means that the failure rate of a certain 
component will not be affected by other AGV com-
ponents. The information about component failures 
can then be fed into different PPN using linking-
arcs, which are the dashed lines in Figure 5.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Component Petri Net. 
4.3 Master Petri net 
As Figure 6 shows, the MPN is used to govern the 
change of phases from the beginning of Phase 1 to 
the successful completion of the whole mission. 
Herein, the token in phase place is used to indicate 
the phase that the AGV is operating at. The system 
failure happening at each phase, i.e. the top event of 
the PPN for each phase, will directly result in the 
failure of the whole mission. Hence, the token in the 
phase mission flow will be transferred to the system 
failure place, so that the mission fails. The switching 
time of transition between two neighbouring phase 
places is the length of the first phase. Likewise, the 
switching time of transition between phase 6 and 
mission finished is the length of phase 6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Master petri net. 
4.4 Simulation Model 
The failure rates of all AGV components mentioned 
in Section 4.2 and the phase lengths in Section 4.3 
are used as inputs of PN simulation. Then, the simu-
lation can be programmed by using the following 
steps based on the logic established above.  
Step 1: Import the phase lengths into the MPN and 
in parallel, generate the switching time of 
the transitions of each component in the 
CPN’s by using the randomly sampling and 
exponential distribution method; 
Step 2: Find the transition with the minimum switch-
ing time and then switch it;  
Step 3: Search through the immediate transitions that 
are directly connected to the present place. 
If any are found enabled, switch them; 
Step 4: Repeat Step 3 until no more immediate tran-
sitions are enabled; 
Step 5: Test for any of the following conditions and 
log them: 
(a) if system has failed, begin next simula-
tion; 
(b) if mission has completed, begin next 
simulation. 
Step 6: Iterate the above simulation for n times based 
on the assumption that the reliability of the 
AGV system can be obtained by repeating the 
simulation for a sufficient number of times. 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to implement the calculation of the mission 
reliability at the end of each phase and the assess-
ment of the unreliability of each phase, the informa-
tion of the length of phase (i.e. the time duration for 
completing each phase) and component failure rate 
is listed in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The total 
time duration to complete the whole mission is 0.51 
hours. 
Herein, it is worthy to note that all data listed in 
Tables 2 and 3 are empirical data only for demon-
stration purpose. In reality, they would be different 
when the AGV is requested to deliver different types 
of missions. 
 
Table 2: Assumed phase lengths. 
Phase Phase Length  
hour 
Mission Allocation & Route Optimization 0.02 
Dispatch to Station 0.2 
Loading of Item 0.02 
Travelling to Storage 0.15 
Unloading 0.02 
Travelling Back to Base 0.10 
 
Table 3: Assumed component failure rates. 
Identity Failure Rate  
frequency/year 
Drive Unit 1.5 
AGV Software Control System 6 
Laser Navigation System 0.875 
Safety Systems 0.375 
Attachments 2 
Batteries 6 
Brake System 2 
Steering System 4 
Manual button 2 
 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 is applied as described 
in Section 4 to calculate the unreliability of each 
phase and the mission reliability at the end of each 
phase. The obtained calculation results are shown in 
Table 4. In order to ensure a good convergence of 
the computing result, one billion simulations are per-
formed in the process of this calculation. 
 
Table 4: PN simulation results. 
Phase 
Phase 
failures 
Phases 
started 
Phase  
unreliability 
Mission  
reliability at 
phase end 
1 18449 1000000000 0.00001845 0.999982 
2 244863 999981551 0.00024486 0.999737 
3 72843 999736688 0.00007286 0.999664 
4 218911 999663845 0.00021898 0.999445 
5 22488 999444934 0.00002250 0.999422 
6 125509 999422446 0.00012558 0.999297 
 
From the calculation results presented in Table 4, 
it is found that phase 2 ‘dispatch to station’ and 
phase 4 ‘travelling to storage’ show the largest phase 
unreliability values. This means that the AGV is 
more likely to fail when it delivers the tasks of these 
two phases. Additionally, it is noticed that as imag-
ined, the mission reliability at the end of each phase 
decreases gradually against the number of phases 
that the AGV has successfully completed. This sug-
gests that without maintenance, the more missions 
are completed, the more unreliable the AGV system 
will tend to be.  
In order to validate the aforementioned PN 
method and the reliability of the mission assessment 
results obtained from it, FTA is also performed in 
this paper for verification purposes. The details of 
FTA are introduced as follows.       
Firstly, the system failure in phase j, i.e. Tj, is cal-
culated by using the following equation  
    ilurePhase j Fa Success to j-Phase =Tj 11   (1) 
Then, the probability of failure of basic event A in all 
phases from i to j (i.e. qAi,j ) can be calculated using 
the equation 
jAiA
ji
tt
A e=eq
  1
,
          (2) 
where λA refers to the failure rate of a basic event A,  
tj is the length of phase j. 
The unreliability of phase j can be calculated by 
 11
11
1
,j-
,j
jj
R
R
-=-R=Q           (3) 
where Rj denotes the success probability of phase j, 
R1,j is the success probability till the end of phase j. 
In the FTA calculation, the component will be 
taken into account only when it is involved to com-
plete a phase. It will not be considered if it is irrele-
vant to the phase. Applying the aforementioned 
method to calculate the unreliability of each phase 
and the mission reliability at the end of each phase 
within MFOP, the obtained results are listed in Table 
5.  
 
Table 5: The resultant mission reliability and phase 
unreliability.   
Phase Phase unreliability 
Mission reliability at phase 
end 
1 0.00001855 0.999981 
2 0.00024386 0.999738 
3 0.00007266 0.999665 
4 0.00021915 0.999446 
5 0.00002243 0.999423 
6 0.00012527 0.999298 
 
The comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows that the 
simulation results obtained from PN method are very 
close to those analytical solutions derived from FTA. 
The simulation errors of both the unreliability of 
each phase and the mission reliability at the end of 
each phase are below 1%. To ease understanding, the 
details of the comparison of phase unreliability re-
sults are given in Table 6. This fully demonstrates 
that the PN method is as accurate as FTA in AGV 
reliability assessment. Thus, it is a promising time 
saving and cost-effective approach that can be 
widely used in the future to deal with the reliability 
problems existing in complex systems.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of analytical and simulation unreli-
ability results. 
Phase FTA Analysis PN Simulation Average error 
   % 
1 0.00001855 0.00001845 0.545 
2 0.00024386 0.00024486 0.412 
3 0.00007266 0.00007286 0.282 
4 0.00021915 0.00021898 0.077 
5 0.00002243 0.0000225 0.309 
6 0.00012527 0.00012558 0.243 
 
In addition, in order to demonstrate that one bil-
lion simulations are good enough to ensure a reliable 
assessment result, the variation tendency of the con-
vergence curve when calculating Phase 1 unreliabil-
ity is shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Convergence of phase 1 unreliability. 
 
From Fig.7, it can be found that the value of unre-
liability of phase 1 has converged to the analytical 
result after performing 100 million simulations. So, 
performing 1 billion simulations in this paper is suf-
ficient enough to guarantee the reliability of the cal-
culation result. Thus, all PN calculation results and 
the conclusions drawn from them are trustable.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In order to develop an efficient and reliable approach 
to assessing the reliability of AGVs, PN method is 
tried in this paper to calculate the mission reliability 
at the end of each phase and assess the unreliability 
of each phase of a typical AGV transport system. 
Moreover, the calculation results are verified by the 
FTA. Through this research, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn: 
(1) The results obtained by PN model are very close 
to these obtained from FTA. This fully demonstrates 
that PN method is an effective approach to conduct-
ing system reliability assessment; 
(2) Both PN simulation and FTA calculation have 
suggested that the AGV is more likely to fail when 
completing the phase ‘dispatch to station’ and the 
phase ‘travelling to storage’. But it is worthy to note 
that such a judgement is made only based on the as-
sumptions given in Tables 2 and 3. In reality, the 
judgement result would be different, depending on 
the environmental, loading and operational condi-
tions of the AGVs;   
(3) Both FTA and PNs calculation results suggest 
that if without maintenance, the more missions are 
completed, the more unreliable the AGV system will 
tend to be; 
(4) In contrast to FTA, PN method provides a more 
convenient approach to predicting the reliability of 
complex systems since the PN method does not rely 
on the calculation of analytical equations, which are 
often difficult to establish, particulalrly for complex 
systems. Also the PN approach is able to account for 
dependencies which may occur, which FTA cannot 
do. 
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